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Introduction
The Clinton administration, seconded by a ma-
jority in Congress as well as many economic
experts, has made the adoption of new revenue
sources a central element of its deficit reduction
efforts. According to Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) projections, over fiscal years (FY)
1994 to 1998, the federal government would
borrow about $355 billion less under the Clin-
ton budget proposals than if it merely contin-
ued with the tax and spending programs in place,
or planned, at the beginning of FY1993- Almost
75 percent of this difference is accounted for by
new federal receipts.
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However, even if the Clinton budgets unfold
as envisioned, the federal deficit relative to
gross domestic product (GDP) in FY1998 will
differ little from the level realized in FY1989,
the year just prior to the confluence of a pro-
tracted economic slowdown and the significant,
but unusual, outlays associated with the savings
and loan crisis. Worse yet, virtually all forecasts
suggest that after FY1998, deficits will again begin
to climb dramatically. Given these circumstances—
and the probability that some of the tax changes cur-
rently on the table will be scaled back or rejected—
it is likely that many of the revenue alternatives the
administration has opted against will find their way
back into policy deliberations in the near future.
One of the alternatives reportedly considered
in the early stages of the Clinton team's budget
deliberations was the suspension of adjustments
to income-tax rate brackets that automatically oc-
cur when the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rises.
In fact, this alternative has been periodically dis-
cussed ever since inflation indexation was intro-
duced by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981 (ERTA).
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The fact that monetary policy can influence
government revenues is at the heart of tradi-
tional concerns about central-bank independ-
ence. Indeed, recognizing the temptation for
governments to compromise long-run price sta-
bility in the service of short-run fiscal pressures
is the key to understanding the history and
• 1 See Altig and Gokhale (1993) for a detailed explanation of these
estimates.
• 2 See Tatom (1985) and Altig and Carlstrom (1991a) for more-
detailed descriptions of these provisions.evolution of centralized monetary institutions.
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For those who, like us, believe that great skepti-
cism should accompany any policy that introduces
an inflationary bias into the economic environ-
ment, making government receipts positively re-
lated to the inflation rate is sufficient reason to be
wary of abandoning indexation.
Quite apart from these considerations, how-
ever, is the simpler issue of efficiency. Suspen-
sion of inflation indexing raises revenues by
permanently increasing the income base to
which tax rates are applied. A straightforward
alternative would be to continue adjusting the
tax base for price-level changes while simulta-
neously increasing the applicable rates. The for-
mer approach is preferable to the latter only if
the economic costs of allowing inflation to ex-
pand the tax base are less than the costs of in-
creasing tax rates to levels sufficient to raise an
equivalent amount of revenue.
In this article, we formally address this issue,
asking whether, in the long run, the utility of
an average consumer is higher when a given
amount of revenue is raised by temporarily
abandoning inflation indexation, as opposed
to adopting a comparable, but explicit, change
in the rate structure. Our analysis employs the
well-known quantitative framework pioneered
by Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff (an
extensive discussion of which can be found in
their 1987 book Dynamic Fiscal Policy), and a
rate structure similar to the one found in the
current U.S. federal tax code. In all of the cases
we consider, direct changes in tax rates are
superior to the strategy of raising revenue by
forgoing inflation adjustments.
Although a rising price level can affect tax
liabilities in many ways, the channel relevant
for our discussion is associated with bracket
creep, or the tendency for taxpayers to be
pushed into higher rate brackets as a result of
inflation-induced increases in nominal income. In
section I, we briefly review the specifics of indexa-
tion in the U.S. tax code, emphasizing the bracket-
creep issue and its relation to another important
effect of inflation, capital-income mismeasure-
ment. Section II then illustrates the effect of sus-
pending inflation indexation and contrasts this
approach with one involving structural changes
in the tax code. In section III, we lay out the ba-
sic model from which we calculate the welfare
costs of bracket creep as a revenue source. The




Indexation of the personal tax code formally
commenced in 1985 under provisions of ERTA.
Ad hoc indexation, in the form of infrequent
adjustments of nominal tax brackets, personal
exemption levels, and so on, was periodically
legislated prior to 1985, but ERTA represented
the first time that regular, ongoing inflation ad-
justments were codified in the tax laws.
Under ERTA, indexation required annual ad-
justments in the dollar value of tax-bracket limits
and personal exemption levels based on a cost-
of-living index derived from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics' CPI for urban wage earners (CPIU).
The indexing provisions of ERTA were in effect
for only two years before being superseded by
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). However,
TRA86 extended ERTA's indexing scheme with
only minor modifications.
The particulars of ERTA and TRA86 are such
that inflation adjustments are made with a lag
of approximately one year. For example, to im-
plement inflation adjustments for tax year 1986,
a cost-of-living index was calculated by divid-
ing the average CPIU for 1985 by the average
for 1984. The adjusted tax-bracket limits and
personal exemption levels were then obtained
by multiplying those in effect for the 1984 tax
year by the resulting cost-of-living index. Thus,
the procedure effectively adjusts the tax code
in a given year using realized rates of inflation
through the prior year.
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Because inflation adjustments are not con-
temporaneous, the accumulated effects of
bracket creep might not be zero in any given
year. However, if indexation is otherwise per-
fect, this is not an issue in the long run, which
is the focus of our analysis. To clarify, suppose
that real income is constant and equal to y,
and that nominal income in year t grows by
1 + nt, where n, is the annual rate of inflation.
Ignoring exemptions, deductions, and other ad-
justments to gross income, the ERTA and TRA86
indexation schemes can be thought of as pro-
cedures that effectively deflate nominal income
in each year by one plus the rate of inflation
• 3 A more complete articulation of this position is contained in the
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's 1990 Annual Report.
• 4 This statement is not precisely correct, since ERTA provided for-
mulas for annual cost-of-living indexes that used October through Sep-
tember data.B 0 X 1
The Effects of Bracket Creep:
A Simple Hypothetical Example
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25 > 1,000
If an individual has a constant real income of $1,000, the an-
nual inflation rate is 3 percent, and indexation is suspended
for two years, then the sequence of taxable income levels,













































































for the previous year?
year t is given by
Thus, taxable income in
y*=y
where we have designated the year in which
indexing commences as time period 1. Be-
cause the long run, or steady state, is charac-
terized by the condition 71 = 7t _ x (for all j), it
is clear from the above expression that long-
run taxable income just equals real income y
if timing lags are the only flaws in the adjust-
ment provisions.
Unfortunately, timing lags are not the only
flaw; problems with our current indexation
• 5 Formally, the law requires that the income limits to which particu-
lar rates apply in year / be inflated by the factor Pt_ 1 /Pb, where P is the
appropriately defined CPIU and b refers to the base year used in the ad-
justment. However, because P,_f/Pb just equals nj:],+1(1+jiy),
the indexing procedures are equivalent to holding the rate limits constant
and adjusting nominal income as described.
methods would exist even if all adjustments
were contemporaneous. To see this, note that
nominal income in year t, relative to year t-\
(which for simplicity we will henceforth as-
sume is the base year), is given by
where w is real wage income, A is the house-
hold stock of assets (from the previous period),
and R is the nominal rate of return on these
assets. Real income, on the other hand, is
given by
y,= wt+ At_x (Rt- n,) /(I + n,).
Although deflating nominal income by
1 + n t is fine for obtaining real wage income,
this adjustment is not appropriate for capital in-
come. Specifically, dividing nominal asset in-
come (R(- At_x) by one plus the inflation rate
would result in an overstatement of capital in-
come by an amount equal to ntA t_x /(I + % t).
This capital-income mismeasurement prob-
lem is logically distinct from the bracket-creep
problem per se: Although distortions from
bracket creep would vanish under a flat-tax re-
gime, distortions from capital-income mismeas-
urement would remain. Furthermore, as shown,
indexation as currently implemented does not
address the problem of overstating real capital
income in inflationary environments.
On the other hand, because capital-income
mismeasurement does result in an overstatement
of real income, it contributes to bracket-creep
effects. In what follows, we provide calculations
that examine the effects of suspending indexation






Bracket creep effectively raises the income tax
base by an amount equal to the inflation rate
realized for the period over which indexation
is suspended. Although this point is fairly obvi-
ous, we provide a simple example to make the
discussion a bit more concrete.
Suppose that the marginal tax-rate schedule
is as described in box 1, that a representative
taxpayer has a constant real income of $1,000,
and that the price level increases by 3 percent
every year. Treating time 0 as the base year,
assume that indexation is forgone in years 1 and2. As shown in the box, in the long run (after
period 2) this policy causes nominal income to
exceed the 0-percent rate bracket by about 6 per-
cent in every period. As a consequence, the
marginal tax rate faced by our average tax-
payer is higher from time 1 onward, even
though real income is unchanged.
Reflecting the simple two-bracket rate struc-
ture proposed in this example, temporarily
shelving inflation adjustments for two years (or
longer) has exactly the same effect on margin-
al tax rates as would a one-year suspension:
In both cases, the marginal tax rate rises from
0 to 25 percent. However, as seen in the last
column of the second table in box 1, the aver-
age tax rate increases as long as indexation is
suspended. This reflects the fact that inflation
expands the amount of income subject to the
25 percent rate, even when the marginal rate it-




where cs is real consumption expenditure at age
s, ls is leisure (where the total time endowment
has been normalized to one), r is the pre-tax real
interest rate (i? — JU) /(I + Jt), to is the pre-tax real
market wage, es is an exogenous human capital
productivity endowment, ts. is the individual's
marginal tax rate, and 7^. is a lump-sum transfer
payment equaling the individual's total tax pay-
ment.
7 The parameters oc and <5l represent,
respectively, the inverse of the intertemporal elas-
ticities of substitution in consumption and in leisure.
The parameter p" is the subjective time-discount




In subsequent sections, we quantitatively com-
pare the long-run effects of raising revenue
through bracket creep with those that arise from
raising the same amount of revenue by proportion-
ately increasing statutory marginal tax rates. The
analysis uses a general-equilibrium overlapping-
generations model, similar to that of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987), in which individuals face a
tax-rate schedule and indexing scheme much
like those legislated by TRA86. In this section, we
outline the model's structure and discuss its param-
eterization. More-detailed discussions of similar
frameworks can be found in Auerbach and Kotli-
koff and in Altig and Carlstrom (1991b, 1992).
Preferences and the
Budget Constraint
Assuming that productive life starts at age 1, a
representative member of each generation in
the model's steady state maximizes a time-





• 6 Simulations in this paper consider the effect of bracket creep
only on marginal tax rates. Because tax revenues are returned to agents in
a lump sum, increases in tax revenues that are independent ot marginal




The aggregate production technology is of the
standard Cobb-Douglas form
(3) Y=Ak»,
where Y is aggregate output per unit of labor,
A is an arbitrary scale variable, k is the aggre-
gate capital-labor ratio, and 0 is capital's share
of production. The steady-state value of the
capital stock satisfies
(4) k = Y-C
where C is aggregate consumption per labor
unit, n is the rate of population growth, and 8
is the rate of depreciation on physical capital.
8
• 7 The basis for the human capital productivity profile is the labor
efficiency estimates reported by Hansen (1986). We transformed Han-
sen's discrete function into a continuous function by linear extrapolation.
Because we will be focusing exclusively on steady states, we have
dropped time subscripts for expositional convenience.
• 8 Equation (4) is obtained from the goods-market-clearing condition
Y,= C,+ (1 +n)*/t1 -(1 -8)*,



















Subjective rate of time
preference
Utility weight of leisure
Population growth rate












Throughout the remainder of this paper, we
focus specifically on the pure distortionary ef-
fects of the different tax regimes considered.
Accordingly, we assume that all revenues raised
through income taxes are rebated to the affected
cohort via lump-sum transfers, so that both








where y* is taxable income and y defines the
maximum level of taxable income for which
the lower marginal tax rate, x
l, is applicable.
In the benchmark case, we choose x
l = 0.15,
x
 H = 0.28, and set y using the 1989 tax sched-
ule for married persons filing jointly. Appendix
1 explains how we calibrated the model to this
tax schedule.
Model Calibration
As a benchmark, the parameters in equations
(1) through (4) are set at the values shown in
table 1. Given the tax code described below
and interpreting a time period as one year,
these parameters yield a steady-state capital/
output ratio of 2.59, compared to 2.68 for the
U.S. economy over the post-World War II peri-
od.
9 With respect to the labor supply, our bench-
mark parameterization implies that, on average,
individuals spend about 28 percent of their total
time endowment in market-wage-generating ac-
tivities. How this matches the actual data depends
on the total hours that individuals have available
for leisure. If we assume that an average of six
hours per day is required for sleeping, over the
postwar period U.S. workers have devoted ap-




• 9 We use the constant-cost net stock of fixed reproducible tangible
wealth reported in the January 1992 Survey of Current Business as our
measure of the U.S. capital stock. This measure includes consumer dur-
ables and government capital.
• 10 The Bureau of Labor Statistics
1 survey of payroll establishments
implies that nonfarm employees worked an average of 36.5 hours per
week over the 1959-92 period.
Solving the Model
The model is solved using numerical techniques.
Our procedures involve conjecturing values for
the aggregate capital stock and labor supply, cal-
culating steady-state consumption and leisure
paths conditional on the factor prices (wages and
interest rates) implied by those conjectures, and
iterating on updates of the aggregate variables
until individual choices are consistent with all rel-
evant market-clearing conditions. More-detailed
discussions are contained in appendix 2 and in





The policy in question involves temporarily for-
going indexation of the tax code. As discussed
in section II, this is equivalent to raising the tax
base by an amount equal to the rate of infla-
tion prevailing over the period when inflation
adjustments are suspended. In this section, we
focus on the pure bracket-creep case, meaning
that we abstract from problems associated with
capital-income mismeasurement. Accordingly,
for each age 5 individual, the new steady-state
tax base obtained after repealing indexation

















where t' is the time at which inflation adjust-
ments are repealed and t' + T is the time at
which they are reinstated. The term n repre-
sents the steady-state rate of inflation. Note
that this definition of taxable income assumes
that deductions are eventually adjusted for in-
flation and incorporates the assumption that in-
flation causes no further overstatement of real
income once indexation commences.
Our experiments contrast the welfare effects
of raising revenue through bracket creep, which
we will refer to as the inflation-revenue regime,
with an alternative strategy of directly increasing
marginal tax rates, which we will refer to as the
structural-revenue regime. All adjustments to the
statutory rate structure involve proportionate in-
creases in both x
 L and I
H.
n
Our welfare measure is the amount of wealth
that must be given to a representative individual
to compensate for utility losses resulting from
raising revenue by suspending inflation indexa-
tion. Specifically, if we let UKR be the lifetime
utility level of each member of a generation liv-
ing in a steady state under the inflation-revenue
regime, and USR be that of an individual under
the structural-revenue regime, then welfare
losses are measured as the share of full wealth
that must be transferred to individuals in the in-
flation regime in order to equate UKR and USR
U
The solid line in figure 1 plots welfare
losses under our benchmark parameterization
for T equals 1-5 years, assuming an annual in-
flation rate of 2.7 percent.
1
3 Suspending in-
dexation for one year would result in a loss
equivalent to about 0.07 percent of wealth.
This number grows, although at a decreasing
rate, as the number of years over which in-
dexation is suspended (and hence the cumula-
tive rate of inflation) increases. Eliminating
inflation adjustments for five years, which in
our examples corresponds to price-level
growth of about 14 percent, results in welfare
losses of roughly 0.14 percent of wealth.
1
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The welfare losses indicated by our bench-
mark simulations indicate that the exploitation
of bracket creep is a relatively inefficient
method of taxation. The source of these losses
can be more fully understood by examining
the broken lines in figure 1. These experi-
ments decompose welfare changes into a "tax
effect" and a "price effect." The tax effect is the
welfare loss due to changes in the marginal tax
rate alone, absent any general-equilibrium price
effect. That is, the tax effect is determined by
setting prices r and © at their steady-state levels
from the structural-revenue regime, and by set-
ting the age-specific marginal tax rates at the
levels determined from the inflation-revenue
regime. The welfare loss is the share of full
wealth that must be transferred under these cir-
cumstances in order to maintain the utility level
• 12 Full wealth is defined as the present value of maximum labor in-
come, that is, the amount of market wealth that-could be generated if indi-
viduals allocated their entire time endowment to working. If welfare
losses are negative, then the inflation-revenue regime generates higher
utility than does the structural-revenue regime. In this case, the welfare
measure would be the share of wealth that must be taken away in order to
lower UnR to the appropriate level.
• 11 We have also attempted experiments in which only the top mar-
ginal tax rate is increased. Interestingly, "Laffer curve" effects render this
alternative inteasible. That is, tax receipts begin to decrease as x
 M rises
before revenues in the structural-revenue regime can be equated to those
in the inflation-revenue regime.
• 13 This corresponds to the inflation rate assumed by the CBO in
its most recent estimates of the revenue effects of suspending indexation.
See CBO (1993).
I 14 When indexation is suspended for five years, the equal-revenue
structural alternative to the inflation-revenue regime implies marginal tax
rates of 16.5 and 30.8 percent.FIGURE 2
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5 Analogously, the price effect is then de-
termined by setting taxes at their steady-state
levels from the structural-revenue regime and




These partial-equilibrium experiments clearly
indicate that the welfare losses from suspending
indexation are driven by the direct effects of taxa-
tion: The differences in interest rates and wages
between the two regimes actually dampen the in-
efficiency of the inflation-revenue case relative to
the structural-revenue case, which is apparent
from the fact that price effects are negative.
The reasons for a strong tax effect are sug-
gested by examining the life-cycle paths of
marginal tax rates, which are shown in figure 2
for the case where indexation is suspended for
two years. Although the rates are marginally
higher in the structural-revenue regime over
much of the life cycle, they are substantially
higher in the inflation-revenue case at some
critical ages, specifically, 23-30 and 37-40.
1
7
These effects show up clearly in figures 3 and
4, which depict life-cycle saving and leisure pro-
files in steady states under the two tax regimes,
again assuming that inflation adjustments are for-
gone for two years. In both cases, saving and
work effort are depressed near the "kinks" in
household budget constraints—the points at
which taxable income equals ~y—induced by
jumps in marginal tax rates. Because the equilib-
rium outcomes are such that distortions are more
severe in the inflation-revenue regime, welfare is
lower relative to the structural-revenue case.
Table 2 reports results from various sensitivity
experiments in which welfare losses are calcu-
lated under alternative settings for the model's
parameters. Suspending indexation creates wel-
fare losses relative to our structural alternatives in
all cases considered. Although these alternatives
are clearly not exhaustive, we conclude from this
evidence that our basic finding is robust to plaus-
ible changes in the model's parameterization.
• 15 Thus, for purposes of calculating the tax effect, the modified
inflation-revenue regime involves solving for the consumption and lei-
sure profiles given rSR, a>s/?, and the marginal tax rates obtained from
the regime's original steady-state solutions.
• 16 Thus, for purposes of calculating the price effect, the modified
inflation-revenue regime involves solving for the consumption and lei-
sure profiles given r^, co^, and the marginal tax rates obtained from
the general-equilibrium steady-state solutions for the structural-revenue
case.
• 17 Age here refers to a period of adult life. If we assume that adult
economic activity begins at biological age 20, then ages 23-30 and 37-
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Implicitly, the experiments conducted in the pre-
vious section assume that taxable income is cal-
culated as follows: First, an individual's real
income is determined, then it is multiplied by the
appropriate inflation adjustment to obtain nomi-
nal income. It is this measure of nominal income
to which inflation adjustments are applied.
The actual procedure, of course, omits the
first step: Nominal taxable income is obtained
directly and then deflated according to the rele-
vant inflation index in order to determine the
appropriate tax liability. As noted in section I,
while the difference in these two procedures is
not critical for calculating real wage income,
the second approach overstates real asset in-
come by 7t • A/{\ + n).
In table 3, we provide a comparison of the
welfare losses with and without capital-income
mismeasurement. Results are reported for sev-
eral different parameterizations of the model
and pertain to experiments in which indexa-
tion is suspended for one year. Not surpris-
ingly, the added, but realistic, complication of
capital-income mismeasurement serves only to
reinforce the welfare losses associated with the
bracket-creep strategy of taxation.
VI. Concluding
Remarks
In its recent analysis of alternative deficit-
reduction options, the CBO argues that increasing
revenue by suspending indexation is inappropri-
ate because it amounts to "unlegislated tax in-
creases." However, because such a suspension is
possible only by a vote of Congress and the sig-
nature of the President, it is unclear why taxes
raised through this approach should be consid-
ered unlegislated. Although it is true that the ad-
ditional amount of revenue obtained over the
course of several years would be determined by
the inflation outcomes associated with Federal
Reserve policy, Congress has ample scope to ex-
press itself on the issue of an appropriate infla-
tion trend.
We suggest a more straightforward objection:
Raising revenue by temporarily suspending in-
dexation is inefficient relative to the more direct
approach of raising marginal tax rates. This ineffi-
ciency arises because distortions of private work
effort and saving decisions associated with rising
marginal tax rates are more severe when reve-
nues are raised through bracket creep. The net
result is that the utility of the average individual
is higher in the long run if inflation indexation is
maintained and if tax revenues are raised by per-
manently adjusting structural tax rates.
Of course, a multitude of additional factors
are ignored in the type of highly stylized
model we have employed here. For instance,
there is no lifetime heterogeneity and therefore
no distributional issues of which to speak. De-
spite this caveat—which, after all, applies to
any model—our analysis suggests that the deci-
sion to abandon the bracket-creep tax strategy
is a wise one. As the public debate on deficit
reduction inevitably continues into the future,
taxation through suspending inflation indexa-
tion is probably one option we should keep
off the table.TABLE 3









Utility weight of leisure
a = 0.25 0.0506
a = 1.0 0.0256
Rate of time preference
p = 0 0.0318
p = 0.04 0.0624
Elasticity of substitution
in consumption
l/o-c = 0.33 0.0344
1 /ac = 0.2 0.0488
Elasticity of substitution
in leisure
1/a, = 0.14 0.0277
1/a, = 0.33 0.0396
Capital share of output
9 = 0.3 0.0285
0 = 0.45 0.0438
Capital depreciation rate
8 = 0.07 0.0378
8 = 0.13 0.0291
Population growth rate
n=0 0.0373
















NOTE: Simulations assume indexation is suspended for one year.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
Taxable income levels are obtained by adjusting
gross income levels for deductions and personal
exemptions. In the benchmark case, we assume
that all taxpayers take the 1989 standard deduction
of $5,200. The personal exemption level in 1989
was $2,000. Multiplying by 3.13, the average fam-
ily size in 1988, yields total personal exemptions of
$6,260. Thus, our simulations assume that d =




Given a marginal tax-rate structure that is a con-
tinuous function of taxable income, the model
can be solved using the following algorithm:
(i) Conjecture values for K and L (and
hence for r and co).
(ii) Conjecture a sequence of marginal tax
rates, x(, for t= 1-55.
(iii) Let uu, i= c,l, denote the age t marginal
utilities of consumption and leisure, respectively,
and let Xt denote the LaGrange multiplier associ-
ated with the time t budget constraint in equa-
tion (2). Given the conjectured net prices, use
equation (2) and the first-order conditions
(AD ucl-X, = 0,




of the Tax Code
Because our simulation model is geared toward
capturing the average effects of life-cycle behav-
ior, we calibrate gross income so that the highest
level of steady-state cohort income matches the
highest median income in the data. Taking 1988
as the reference year, this value was $42,192, as-
sociated with families headed by individuals aged
45-54. This number was obtained from the Cur-
rent Population Reports (series P-60, No. 166,
published by the Bureau of the Census) and was
converted to 1989 dollars according to the CPIU
inflation rate from 1988 to 1989 (4.8 percent).
This yields a value for high income in 1989 dol-
lars of $44,217. The scale of incomes in the
model is chosen so that the highest steady-state
income generated with the chosen tax code and
4 percent inflation is equal to this value.
(A3) -A,,_1 + A.,p[l + r(l-T,)] = 0
to solve for the optimal consumption and lei-
sure plans for members of each generation.
(iv) Apply the implied path of wage and as-
set income to the tax code and update the
path for marginal tax rates. Updates can be ob-
tained using the Gauss-Seidel algorithm.
(v) Repeat steps (iii) and (iv) until the opti-
mal paths of consumption and leisure are con-
sistent with the marginal tax rates they imply.
(vi) Aggregate individual labor and asset
supplies to obtain updates for K and L
(vii) Repeat steps (ii) through (vi) until aggre-
gate labor and asset supplies are consistent with
individual consumption and leisure decisions.
Altig and Carlstrom (1992) demonstrate how a
simple change-of-variables strategy can be used
to apply this algorithm to the case where margin-
al tax rates are a step function of taxable income.References
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